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*DEMOCRATIZATION
AND CIVIL WAR*

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Abstract

Many observers have argued that promoting democracy abroad promotes peace. Mature, stable democracies have not fought wars against each other, and they rarely suffer from civil wars. But the path to the democratic peace is not always smooth. We argue that during the initial phase of a democratic transition, states face a heightened risk of civil war. When authoritarian regimes break down, a panoply of elite factions and popular groups jockey for power in a setting in which repressive state authority has been weakened, yet democratic institutions are insufficiently developed to take their place. This can lead to civil war through the lack of institutional means to regulate or repress factional strife. We test this argument by conducting a statistical analysis. The results indicate that countries in the initial stages of democratization are more than twice as likely to experience civil war as are stable regimes or regimes undergoing a transition to autocracy. Then we discuss the causal mechanisms linking democratization and civil war in cases drawn from the statistical analysis. These findings underscore the risks in trying to promote peace through democratization in countries that lack the institutions to contain factional and communal conflicts.

Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, as well as human rights advocates and neo-conservative publicists, have argued that promoting democracy abroad promotes peace. Mature, stable democracies have not fought wars against each other, and they rarely suffer from civil wars. But the path to the democratic peace is not always smooth. Stalelated, violent democratic transitions in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Authority have been the bane of the Bush Administration's "war on terror" and its plans for a "new Middle East." Likewise, during the 1990s, competitive elections held in the early stages of democratization led directly to major civil wars in Algeria, Burundi, and Yugoslavia.

These cases are hardly unique. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, states that became mired in the initial phase of a democratic transition faced a heightened risk of civil war (Hegre et al 2001; Goldstone et al. 2005). When authoritarian regimes break down, a panoply of elite factions and popular groups jockey for power in a setting in which repressive state authority has been weakened, yet democratic institutions are insufficiently developed to take their place. This can lead to civil war through the lack of institutional means to regulate or repress factional strife.¹

In some cases, civil war results from a gap between rising demands for political participation and the lagging development of political institutions needed to accommodate those demands.² In these circumstances, threatened established elites as well as newly rising elites are likely to turn to ideological appeals to win mass support. Populist ideology serves as a substitute for the institutions that are too weak to legitimize political power.

¹ Mansfield and Snyder (2005, chaps. 1 and 3) adopt this theoretical perspective explicitly, and Hegre et al. (2001, 34) more briefly acknowledge this as their main causal frame of reference.

² This argument extends the conceptual framework of Huntington (1968) to the explanation of civil wars.

These ideological appeals can be based on almost any social cleavage—nation, ethnicity, religious sect, class, economic sector, or urban/rural. Elites, however, tend to prefer nationalism, ethnicity, and sectarianism, because these ideologies play down the economic conflict of interest between elites and masses, emphasizing instead the purportedly more fundamental commonalities of blood and culture. Threatened authoritarian elites may gamble for resurrection by playing the nationalist, ethnic, or religious card in the hope of gaining a mass following by invoking threats from outsiders. Rising elites may find that ethnic or religious groups are easier to mobilize than class or secular constituencies when institutions that cut across traditional cultural groupings are poorly developed. Where ethnic and sectarian cleavages are unavailable to mobilize, elites may turn to populist economic ideologies, which demand rule in the name of the people but not strict legal accountability. Liberal democratic appeals based on full electoral and legal accountability are likely to succeed only when favorable conditions, such as effective political and legal institutions, accompany the early stages of a democratic transition (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 61-62).

While mass ideological politics has been prominent in some cases of democratization and civil war, the demand for mass political participation was muted in other cases. Sustained, programmatic ideological appeals to mobilize mass support are absent or superficial in these cases. Politics centers instead on factions—often armed groups—jockeying for power in a setting where authoritarian and democratic institutions are both weak. Force, patronage, and opportunism loom as the trump cards in such environments. Nonetheless, elections may be used as a tool for political competition. Strong factions may see elections as a way to consolidate power, to legitimize their power in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences, and to demonstrate their superior strength without having to engage in ruinous fighting. Even illiberal politicians can use elections to demonstrate their ability to out-organize their foes in using patronage, media control, or intimidation to dominate the electoral campaign (for example, the 1997 election of the ruthless

Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor). Sometimes this strategy works to institutionalize authority without war and gradually regularizes electoral politics. However, in its initial phases, electoral competition often degenerates into violence when the loser of an election chooses to escalate the struggle rather than accept the result, or when the winner tries to reassert ruthless despotism (Stedman and Lyons 2004, esp. pp. 147-49, 152-57; Lindberg 2006, esp. p. 15).

After briefly discussing the current state of scholarship on democratization and civil war, we distinguish between incomplete and complete democratic transitions. We then show in a statistical analysis that countries undergoing an incomplete democratic transition are more than twice as likely to experience civil war as are stable regimes or regimes undergoing a transition to autocracy. Then we discuss the causal mechanisms linking democratization and civil war in cases drawn from our statistical study. These findings underscore the risks in trying to promote peace through democratization in countries that lack the institutions to contain factional and communal conflicts. In the conclusion, we assess implications for devising strategies of democracy promotion that entail less risk.

Studies of Democratization and Civil War

Over the past decade, a number of studies have analyzed the links between democratization and civil war. Snyder (2000) argued that democratic transitions often give rise to nationalist conflicts, including civil violence. The process of democratization stimulates mass political mobilization and rising demands for political participation. Without coherent domestic institutions to channel and manage these popular pressures, there is an incentive for elites to resort to nationalist appeals in order to strengthen their legitimacy and tar opponents as enemies of the nation. Moreover, nationalism helps to justify claims by rising elites that ethnic minorities and other political opponents should be excluded from the political process. These dynamics often

retard the democratic transition. They also tend to precipitate domestic violence, launched either by nationalists who hope to crush their opposition or by ethnic minorities that fear they will soon be marginalized or attacked. Snyder examined a variety of case studies spanning the past two centuries that provided considerable support for this argument.

Recently, a number of other studies have addressed this issue. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) found that, in the short term, democratization increases the likelihood of civil war, relative to stable regimes, but no more so than autocratic transitions. They also found that anocratic regimes – those that are neither coherent democracies nor coherent autocracies – are more war prone than either democratic or autocratic regimes. A number of other studies concur with this conclusion (Gurr 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). In fact, the Political Instability Task Force (Bates et al. 2003) concludes that anocracy is the most important “risk factor” for civil unrest. Fearon and Laitin (2003, 85 fn. 32) briefly mention that both democratization and autocratization increase the risk of such war, and assert that autocratization is the more dangerous process, but they do not emphasize this finding. Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein (2005, chap. 4) claim that democratization has little bearing on political conflict, although they analyze civil and international wars as a single group and cover only a twenty-five year period.

In addition to research on civil war, various studies have examined the linkages between democratization and external conflicts. Some of these studies distinguish two phases of democratization: (1) the transition from autocracy towards a partially democratic regime, which we refer to as an incomplete democratic transition; and (2) the shift to a fully institutionalized democracy, which we refer to as a complete democratic transition (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). When no distinction is drawn between incomplete and complete democratic transitions, there is only limited evidence that democratization affects conflict (Thompson and Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001). However, studies that distinguish between them have

found that incomplete democratization occurring in the face of weak domestic institutions is likely to promote war, whereas complete democratization is largely unrelated to the outbreak of external violence (Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 2005).

The Research Design and the Statistical Model

The distinction between incomplete and complete democratization, which has not been addressed in the existing literature on civil wars, is central to our analysis. Civil war is particularly likely to break out during the first phase of democratization, during which old elites threatened by the transition often continue to be powerful and the institutions needed to regulate mass political participation are generally underdeveloped. The second phase of democratization occurs when there is open political competition and complete governmental accountability to the populace. During this phase, elites who fear that democratic consolidation will reduce their power and prestige may be tempted to play the nationalist card, thereby provoking civil violence. As the transition is completed, however, advocates of democracy have greater institutional capacity to block such maneuvers. Equally, the commitment of these advocates to consolidating democracy becomes increasingly credible. Hence, transitions to a coherent democracy may give rise to some increase in the risk of civil war, but this risk rapidly attenuates with the consolidation of democracy.

To measure incomplete and complete democratization, we rely on the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2005), which include annual measures of the competitiveness of the process through which a country's chief executive is selected, the openness of this process, the extent to which institutional constraints exist on a chief executive's decision-making authority, the competitiveness of political participation within a country, and the degree to which binding rules govern political participation within it. Gurr and his colleagues have used these data to create a well-known measure of regime type (*Regime*) that ranges from -10 to 10 (Gurr, Jaggers, and

Moore 1989; Jagers and Gurr 1995).³ Jagers and Gurr (1995) define “coherent” democracies as states where *Regime* > 6, “coherent” autocracies as states where *Regime* < -6, and all remaining states as incoherent or anocracies.

We measure democratization over five-year intervals. We code each state, *i*, as democratic, autocratic, or anocratic in year *t*-6 and then again in year *t*-1. Civil war, as we explain below, is measured in year *t*. Democratization occurs if, during a five-year period, a state’s regime changes from autocratic to either democratic or anocratic, or from anocratic to democratic. To distinguish the effects of incomplete and complete democratization, we define two variables. First, *Complete Democratization* equals 1 if state *i* changes from either an autocracy or an anocracy to a coherent democracy during the period from *t*-6 to *t*-1 and 0 otherwise. Second, *Incomplete Democratization* equals 1 if *i* changes from an autocracy to an anocracy during this period and 0 otherwise.

Some studies have concluded that all regime transitions, not just those in a democratic direction, heighten the risk of domestic violence (e.g., Huntington 1991, 192; Hegre et al. 2001). As such, we also examine the effects of regime change in an autocratic direction. *Autocratization* equals 1 if state *i* undergoes a transition from either democracy or anocracy to autocracy, or from democracy to anocracy, during the period from *t*-6 to *t*-1 and 0 otherwise. Unlike our analysis of democratization, we do not distinguish between incomplete and complete autocratization because there have been very few instances (one or two depending on the time period that is analyzed) where an incomplete autocratic transition was followed by a civil war. Finally, we define a variable, *Stable Regime*, that equals 1 if the regime type of state *i* is the same in years *t*-6 and *t*-1.

³ The Polity data include various yearly observations in which a country is coded as -66, -77, or -88 because its institutions are in flux, are difficult to code, or are controlled by a foreign power. We follow the Polity project in transforming these “standardized authority codes” into values of the variable *Regime*. On this transformation, see Marshall and Jagers 2005. Following this procedure reduces the number of missing observations in our sample.

In the following analysis, we start by including *Complete Democratization*, *Autocratization*, and *Stable Regime*. The reference category is an incomplete democratic transition. Since we have argued that incompletely democratizing states are more prone to civil wars than any of these other regime types, we expect the coefficients of each of these three variables to be negative.

Control Variables

In addition to regime type and regime change, it is important to account for factors that previous studies have linked to the outbreak of civil war and that might account for any observed relationship between democratization and domestic violence. Hegré and Sambanis (2006; Sambanis 2004) point out that virtually all statistical models of the domestic sources of civil war include (the natural logarithm of) each state's population and level of economic development, as well as the length of time since a state last experienced a civil war. These are our primary control variables.

The extant literature has produced a widespread consensus that civil war is particularly likely to occur in less developed countries and heavily populated states. We use per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to measure development in our analysis of the post-World War II era. We use per capita energy consumption to measure development in our analysis of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries since reliable data on per capita GDP do not exist for many countries prior to World War II. Data on per capita GDP are drawn from the Penn World Table (version 6.2); data on energy consumption are taken from the Correlates of War (COW) Project's National Material Capabilities (version 3.02).⁴ To measure national population, we use data in these two sources, as

⁴ In cases where per capita GDP is missing for a given country-year, we initially fill in values using data on the change in per capita GDP compiled by the World Development Indicators (2005, online version). We then estimate as many of the remaining missing values as possible, using per capita energy consumption, region-specific dummy variables, and a variable indicating whether the

well as in the World Development Indicators (2005, online version) and Banks (2005). All of these variables are expressed in natural logarithms and measured in year $t-1$.

Various studies have argued that, for a given country, civil wars tend to cluster over time. The longer the time since a state last experienced a civil war, the lower the probability of one breaking out (Hegre et al. 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). To address any such temporal dependence in the data, we include the length of time, as of t , since a civil war broke out in state i .

In addition, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) have emphasized the need to account for any spatial clustering of civil wars. More specifically, they maintain that civil wars occurring in countries neighboring state i in year t increase the likelihood of war in i itself in year t . Following Salehyan and Gleditsch, we include a variable indicating whether a civil war is going on in any of state i 's neighbors, where neighbors are coded as countries within 150 miles of each other, using the COW's Direct Contiguity data (version 3.0).

Measuring Civil War

The sample used in the following statistical analysis includes all states coded as members of the interstate system by the COW Project during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Correlates of War Project 2005). To code civil wars, we rely on two different data sets. First, we analyze the COW data set, which has been used extensively in previous empirical studies of civil war. To qualify as a civil war in this data set, Small and Singer (1982, 210) require that there be "(a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government,

country is an oil exporter (operationalized as cases where oil constitutes at least one third of a country's total merchandise exports, based on data in the World Development Indicators). This procedure is similar to that of Fearon and Laitin (2003, 81 fn. 17). However, we do not estimate missing values of per capita energy consumption since it is very difficult to find data covering a wide range of countries throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on variables that are likely to yield reasonable imputed values of this factor.

and (c) effective resistance by both sides.” Furthermore, they stipulate that civil wars be sustained over some length of time and that they yield a certain number of battle deaths (usually 1,000), although the details of these stipulations seem to have changed over time (Sarkees 2000; Sambanis 2004, 816-20). Since the COW data has been used with considerable regularity in the quantitative literature, it is useful to begin our analysis with this compilation, which covers the period from 1816 to 1997.

Second, because much of the empirical literature on civil war focuses on the period since World War II and data for many variables that have been linked to such conflicts in previous research are only available for the past half century, we also analyze that era separately. To conduct this analysis, we rely on a data set compiled by Sambanis (2004), which covers the period from 1945 to 1999. Sambanis points out that existing data on civil wars suffer from an array of problems, including the establishment of arbitrary thresholds of violence to distinguish civil wars from lesser forms of domestic conflict, ambiguity about when wars begin and end, and the issue of how to distinguish a civil war from an external war. He develops an eleven-point definition of civil wars to address these problems and an accompanying data set that has been used with increasing regularity (Sambanis 2004, 829-32; see also Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008).

In all of the following analyses, we focus on the outbreak of civil war. More specifically, War is the log of the odds that state i experiences the onset of a civil war in year t , where we observe 1 if a war begins and 0 otherwise. We code this variable in two ways and then run separate analyses based on each coding decision. Initially, we code every civil war that is listed by COW and Sambanis, respectively, a tack that is consistent with some previous studies (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). This produces a total of 210 country-years in which a civil war broke out based on the COW data set and 145 country-years based on Sambanis’s compilation. However, both the COW and Sambanis’s data contain a number of cases in which one civil war starts in a

given country before a previous civil war has ended. Following a number of other studies (e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), we also drop all observations for state i after a civil war starts until that war ends, even if another war is coded as beginning during that interval.⁵ This latter coding rule yields a total of 195 country-years marked by the onset of a civil war based on the COW data and 119 country-years based on Sambanis's data.⁶

When analyzing all observations, including cases where a given country may become embroiled in a new civil war before a pre-existing civil war ends, it is important to account for the fact that the likelihood of a war in state i may depend on whether i is already involved in a war. Consequently, when we analyze all civil wars listed by COW or by Sambanis, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether a civil war was ongoing in state i in the previous year, $t-1$.

The Results

Descriptive statistics for the variables described in the previous section and some additional variables that we analyze later are presented in Table 1. Since, in all cases, the observed value of our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate our models using logistic regression. To account for the grouped nature of the data by country, the standard errors for each estimated coefficient are clustered by country. These results are shown in Tables 2 (the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and 3 (the period 1945-1999). In each table, the dependent variable in the first three columns is the onset of all civil wars, regardless of whether a state is

⁵ Like our analysis, a number of studies have estimated models of civil wars using both of these coding procedures to assess the robustness of results. See, for example, Sambanis 2004 and Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006.

⁶ Note that this is not exactly the same as the number of civil wars in these data sets. Sambanis lists three cases in which two civil wars broke out in the same country in a given year and COW lists seven cases in which multiple civil wars broke out in the same country in a particular year.

already engaged in such a war. The results in the final three columns are generated after excluding observations where, for a given country, a civil war is already underway.

These findings provide substantial evidence that incomplete democratization is a potent impetus to civil war. In the first and fourth column of each table, each coefficient estimate of *Autocratization* and *Stable Regime* is negative and statistically significant, indicating that autocratizing countries and states that do not undergo a regime change are considerably less likely to experience the onset of a civil war than a state in the midst of an incomplete democratic transition. These effects are sizable as well as strong. Taking this set of results as a whole, incompletely democratizing countries are more than twice as likely to become embroiled in a civil war as a stable regime and between two and a half times and four times as likely to experience such a war as an autocratizing country.⁷ All of these differences in the predicted probability of war are statistically significant (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). In contrast, an incomplete democratic transition is only marginally more likely than a complete democratic transition to precipitate a civil war. The coefficient estimate of *Complete Democratization* is negative in three out of four cases, but it is significant in just one instance. This reflects the fact that, as we mentioned earlier, transitions to a coherent democracy also increase the risk of civil war, although somewhat less so than incomplete democratic transitions. To more clearly compare the effects of these different regime types, Figure 1 presents the predicted probability of civil war for each one, based on the results in the first columns of Table 2 and Table 3.⁸

In addition, there is evidence that civil wars tend to break out in highly populous and less developed countries, as well as those with a neighbor that is embroiled in a civil war. The

⁷ All of these predicted probabilities are generated using the CLARIFY program, based on 10,000 simulations of each model, and setting the remaining variables to their sample means.

⁸ To compute these predicted probabilities, we set each continuous control variable to its mean value and we assume that no civil war was ongoing in year $t-1$.

coefficient estimates of *Population* and *Neighbor War* are positive, the estimates of *Development* are negative, and all but one of them (*Population* when we analyze the post-World War II sample and exclude country-years in which a civil war is ongoing) is statistically significant. Equally, the effects of these factors are quantitatively large. Holding constant the remaining variables, a one standard deviation rise in the mean value of *Population* increases the predicted probability of civil war by 20 to 25 percent in the post-World War II era and by 45 to 50 percent over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Increasing the mean value of *Development* by one standard deviation yields about a 40 percent reduction in the predicted probability of war, regardless of which era we consider. Having a neighbor in which a civil war is taking place yields roughly a 70 percent rise in the predicted probability of such a war breaking out over the past half century, and a 40 to 45 percent increase in this probability over the past two centuries. All of these changes in the predicted probability of war are statistically significant.

Finally, when focusing on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we find considerable evidence of temporal dependence in the data. The longer the period of time since a state last experienced a civil war, the lower its odds of becoming enmeshed in a new one. In addition, when we analyze the outbreak of all civil wars during this period, there is strong evidence that the likelihood of a war beginning declines if another war is currently underway. However, we find no evidence of either pattern in the data when analyzing the period since World War II.

The Effects of Anocracy

Various studies have concluded that all anocracies are particularly prone to civil war (Gurr 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Bates et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). As Sambanis (2004, 836) points out, this may reflect the fact that anocracies “are neither as effective as autocracies in repression nor as good as democracies in peaceful conflict resolution.”

A related explanation is that some anocracies are failed states that become breeding grounds for violence and lack the institutional capacity to quell domestic unrest. Since incomplete democratic transitions involve shifts from autocracy to anocracy, it is important to ensure that the observed influence of these transitions does not stem from any more general effect of anocracy on civil violence.

We address this issue by breaking down *Stable Regime* into three variables. One indicates whether state i was a stable anocracy between years $t-6$ and $t-1$, the second indicates whether it was a stable autocracy, and the third indicates whether it was a stable democracy. The results shown in the second and fifth columns of Tables 2 and 3 indicate that incomplete democratic transitions are more dangerous than stable anocracies. In all four cases, the estimated coefficient of *Stable Anocracy* is negative, and it is statistically significant in three of these cases. Equally, in these three cases, the difference in the predicted probability of civil war between stable anocracy and incomplete democratization is significant as well (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). As such, the effects of incomplete democratization are not simply due to a tendency for all anocracies to promote civil war.

Furthermore, each coefficient estimate of *Autocratization*, *Stable Autocracy*, and *Stable Democracy* is negative and statistically significant. Like before, however, there is little evidence of a significant difference between states experiencing a complete and an incomplete democratic transition. The coefficient estimate of *Complete Democratization* is negative in three out of four cases, but it is only significant in one instance. Again, this latter result reflects the dangers that accompany transitions to a coherent democracy, as well as incomplete democratic transitions. However, the fact that complete democratization is somewhat less likely to precipitate civil war than incomplete democratization and that stable democracies are especially unlikely to experience civil

violence indicates that the dangers associated with complete democratization rapidly attenuate as democracy starts becoming consolidated.

Vreeland (2007) has raised another issue concerning the measurement of anocracy. As we noted earlier, five variables are used to measure *Regime*: (1) the competitiveness of the process through which a country's chief executive is selected, (2) the openness of this process, (3) the extent to which institutional constraints exist on a chief executive's decision-making authority, (4) the competitiveness of political participation within a country, and (5) the degree to which binding rules govern political participation within it. The middle point of each of the latter two variables is a category labeled "factional" (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Vreeland points out that the existence of a civil war is one factor that can lead a state to be coded as factional on these two dimensions. He concludes that since factional regimes tend to be anocracies, the finding that anocracy is associated with civil war could stem from the tendency for states experiencing civil wars to be coded as anocratic. To address this issue, we omit all years $t-1$ in which state i is coded as factional based on either the competitiveness of political participation or the extent to which rules guide political participation and then re-estimate our base model. There is no case in which any of our results change due to this different way of coding regime type.

Assessing the Robustness of the Results

In addition to addressing the effects of anocracy, we conduct a set of additional tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, it is important to ensure that our findings do not stem from country-specific factors (for example, historical legacy or culture) that are omitted from the model. To account for any such heterogeneity across countries, we estimate the model in the third

and sixth columns of Tables 2 and 3 using a conditional logit specification, the equivalent of a fixed-effects treatment. These analyses yield results that are very similar to our earlier findings.⁹

Second, previous studies of civil war during the post-World War II era analyzed the effects of a variety of factors that are not included in our model. These factors include the rate of economic growth, the extent of ethnic fractionalization, the extent of religious fractionalization, the percentage of the population that is Muslim, whether a country derives a substantial portion of its income from the sale of oil, whether it is noncontiguous, and whether its terrain is mountainous (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).¹⁰ We analyze whether any of these factors is driving the relationship between incomplete democratization and civil conflict.

To do so, we enter these variables one at a time in the models shown in columns one and four of Table 3. There is only a single instance in which one of these variables has a statistically significant influence on civil war. Countries that derive a substantial percentage of their income from the sale of oil are more likely to become involved in civil wars, if we analyze all country years, regardless of whether a civil war is currently underway. This finding, which is consistent with some previous research, may reflect the tendency for states that depend on oil revenue to have relative weak state institutions and natural resources that are worth controlling (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004). This is likely to hinder the government's ability to dampen civil violence and to increase the incentives to wrest power from the government.

⁹ We also estimate the model after including year-specific fixed effects to ensure that global factors affecting all states at a given point in time do not account for the observed relationship between incomplete democratization and civil war. These results, which are not presented to conserve space, are also very similar to our initial findings.

¹⁰ Data on these variables are taken from Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; the Penn World Table (version 6.2); and the World Development Indicators (2005, online version).

Nonetheless, in no case does adding one of these variables to our models influence the size, sign, or statistical significance of the remaining variables, including those that measure regime type. Consequently, these results provide no indication that our earlier results are being driven by these additional factors. Instead, we find that the tendency for incomplete democratization to stimulate the outbreak of civil war is quite robust.

Cases and Causal Mechanisms

To gain a better understanding of the causal mechanisms that underlie these statistical patterns, we briefly examine several of the post-World War II cases of incompletely democratizing regimes experiencing civil war in Sambanis's and COW's data sets. (See the Appendix for a complete list of cases.) For purposes of organizing this discussion, we group these cases into three categories of ideological mass politics – ethnonationalism, sectarian populism, and economic populism – and a fourth category of factionalized electoral or constitutional struggles without ideological mass politics.

Ethnonationalism

In various cases, incomplete democratization has stimulated a rise in nationalism that, in turn, has led to the outbreak of internal ethnic conflicts (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). For example, internationally mandated free and fair elections replaced Burundi's Tutsi ethnic minority military dictatorship in 1993 with a Hutu majority power-sharing regime bent on ending Tutsi monopoly over the armed forces. This chain of events triggered a coup and a decade of ethnic civil war that produced over 200,000 fatalities. Although Rwanda did not hold elections on the eve of its 1994 genocide and civil war, it too undertook an internationally mandated transition to power-sharing which included a shift to multiparty politics, a more open (though uglier) media

environment, the burgeoning of civil society groups, and promises of democratization. Both the Hutu extremist genocide campaign and arguably the invasion by the Uganda-based Tutsi army were designed to cut short these democratizing developments. Our database includes both Burundi and Rwanda as civil wars of incomplete democratization.¹¹

Similar dynamics were at work in the ethnic wars that broke out in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.¹² The unraveling of the communist regime led politicians such as Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic to reposition themselves as ethnic nationalists in the newly competitive, though not necessarily free and fair, electoral environment. The result was a series of ethnic wars, including the conflict that broke out between Serbia and the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998. Milosevic had navigated the multiparty politics of Serb nationalism to win a number of partially manipulated electoral contests during the 1990s. In an April 1998 referendum, Serbian voters rejected foreign mediation of the Kosovo dispute. Milosevic fell from power only when he lost the Kosovo war in 2000 and also an election (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 249-53).

Another civil war of incomplete democratization was the renewed separatist struggle in Indonesia's culturally distinct Aceh province following President Suharto's fall from power as a result of the 1998 Asian financial crisis. Indonesia held highly competitive multiparty elections and experienced an increase in press freedom, yet also witnessed massive human rights abuses, rampant corruption at all levels of government, and a political veto wielded by the military. Coinciding with the democratic transition, several dormant communal and separatist conflicts were re-ignited, including the GAM rebels' separatist struggle in oil-rich Aceh province, which had been quiet since 1991. (Aspinall, forthcoming)

¹¹ For a discussion of these cases, see Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 253-57).

¹² This is not a case of incomplete democratization and war based on the five-year periods used in our statistical analysis, but it would emerge if we were to measure regime change over three-year periods instead.

The spark to violence was not simply a temporary weakening of the national government that enticed a reconstituted GAM to fill the political vacuum. The incompletely democratic character of Indonesia's transition played a vital role in the return to war. "Soon after Suharto was removed from office," reports Ross (2005, 27), "Aceh's newly freed media publicized reports of summary executions, torture, rape, and theft committed by the military over the previous decade." Following the referendum that achieved East Timor's independence from Indonesia, massive demonstrations clamored for a similar referendum for Aceh—one in the Acehenese capital of Banda said to comprise a million people.

The elected central government in Jakarta tried to appease Acehenese public opinion through economic concessions and political decentralization that fell short of regional autonomy, let alone sovereign independence, as occurred in East Timor. Even these modest concessions were distrusted, however, because the Indonesian army continued to attack civilians and reneged on promises to withdraw from the province. "People became free to express their grievances toward Jakarta, but the electoral system was too weak to facilitate a peaceful solution," says Ross (2005, 45, 55). "Two key weaknesses were the inability of elected officials to control the military and the instability of the policy-making process, which made the government's commitments less credible." As a result of these characteristic symptoms of incomplete democratization, GAM gained droves of new recruits to its fight.

Sectarian Populism

Religious sectarian violence involving political Islam is another prominent category of civil war in incompletely democratizing states. The dynamics of these conflicts are similar to those of ethnic and nationalist conflicts. Rising or declining elites mobilize mass groups based on

established cultural identities and networks, sometimes against other cultural groups and sometimes against a secular state or other secular social forces.

Though too recent to appear in our statistical study, the sectarian civil violence in incompletely democratizing Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Authority over the past few years reflects this logic. In these cases, causality is difficult to establish because the effects of electoral politics and political ideology are entangled with crises of state-building and foreign intervention.¹³

In our data set, incompletely democratizing Iran fought a civil war against the Kurds in 1981 after the Islamic Revolution. Northern Nigeria suffered thousands of deaths in intra-Islamic violence over the introduction of Shar'ia shortly after a return to civilian rule that our data base codes (perhaps too generously) as a transition to complete democracy. Scholars argue that this violence reflected populist strategies for gaining political power in the suddenly wide-open yet weakly institutionalized Nigerian democracy (Falola 1998, chap. 5). The separatist movement in Aceh, discussed above, was fueled in part by the politicization of a regionally distinctive form of Islam.

Finally, and most dramatically, incompletely democratizing Algeria's civil war, in which between 150,000 and 200,000 people died from 1992 to 2002, pitted a popular Islamic opposition movement against the unpopular secular state. Amid an economic crisis caused by declining oil prices and economic mismanagement, troops loyal to the one-party National Liberation Front regime killed over 500 urban rioters protesting the unavailability of housing and basic food items in October 1988. In an attempt to accommodate and defuse popular opposition, President Chadli Benjedid announced reforms that culminated in multiparty municipal elections in 1990 and

¹³ For arguments about current Middle Eastern cases, see Mansfield and Snyder (2005/2006) and Duffy Toft (2007).

multiparty elections for the national legislature in December 1991. He expected that the regime—shored up by the army, rural loyalists, jerrymandering, and the fading afterglow of the FLN's victory over the French colonialism—could produce a stalemated election that would allow him to retain the upper hand in national politics. He believed that the Islamists would be unable to unite under a single opposition party and that the politics of clan and clientelism would further splinter the anti-regime vote. Moderate oppositionists and local notables could be bought off or intimidated, Benjedid thought.

He was disastrously wrong. The primary Islamic party, FIS, was clearly heading for an outright legislative majority after the first round of voting in December 1991. Consequently, the military intervened, canceled the second round, replaced Benjedid with a five-man council led by a retired hero of the national liberation struggle against France, and tried to suppress the Islamic opposition. The arena of political struggle moved from the ballot box to civil war.

This violent outcome emerged from two related dynamics of political competition in Algeria's weakly institutionalized, incompletely democratizing state. The first was ideological competition for mass support. Political Islam was the most readily available ideology around which the diverse opponents of the ineffective, corrupt, stultifying, largely secular regime could converge. It was an ideology that the FLN had itself inadvertently legitimized under the banner of "Islamic socialism" in the 1960s and 1970s. Political Islam's prospects were further enhanced in the 1980s by the influx of rural immigrants to the cities, the turn from French-based to Arab-based higher education, the pool of unemployed but educated youth in the cities, the rise of non-state social welfare programs through unofficial mosques, and the demonstration effect of the Iranian Revolution. Benjedid's multiparty and mass media opening allowed these currents to organize and become the focal point for regime opponents of varying degrees of religious fervor (Esposito and Voll 1996; Stone 1997).

The second perverse dynamic was the series of miscalculations, bargaining failures, and commitment problems inherent to democratization in a setting where preferences are not well known, relative power is untested, and rules are not well institutionalized. Complicating the process of political accommodation, the ideological politics of Islamic mass mobilization produced a proliferation of voices that decried liberal constitutional processes as un-Islamic. Even if the FLN had been willing to tolerate an electoral victory by moderate Islamists, as the Turkish military has, the Algerian regime could not be sure that the moderate faction would prevail in the internal contest within the diverse Islamic party. The regime saw preemptive repression as the only guarantee that radical Islamists would not end the democratic experiment after reaping the spoils of their electoral victory (Kalyvas 2000).¹⁴

Economic Populism based on Class, Sectoral, and Urban/Rural Ideologies

Although elites in states undergoing an incomplete democratic transition usually prefer nationalist or cultural appeals that divert attention from the economic disparity between elites and the mass supporters they are trying to recruit, sometimes the politically relevant cleavages are inescapably economic—based on class, sector, or the urban/rural divide. This is more likely to be the case when the society is mono-ethnic, when it is marked by extreme income inequality, or when historical legacies have already politicized an economic dimension.¹⁵ In the absence of effective institutions to facilitate political compromise, rising or declining elites in a poorly institutionalized, incompletely democratizing regime may therefore need to mobilize support based on illiberal populist economic ideologies. Sometimes these economic appeals are attached to

¹⁴ A related set of problems, focused on intra-elite political wrangling, is discussed by Greene (2006).

¹⁵ Note especially the recent work on democratization and income distribution by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, chaps. 1 and 2, and pp. 203-7, 246) and Boix (2006).

secondary cultural themes, such as nationalism, religious identity, or indigenous ethnicity. These ideology-fueled socio-economic divisions have given rise to a number of cases of incomplete democratization and civil war.

One example is Argentina's "dirty war," which was initiated against opposition leftist groups in 1975 following the 1973 election of President Juan Perón, his death in 1974, and the succession of his wife Isabel, the elected Vice President. Since the late 1940s, Peronism had comprised a shifting coalition of the military, organized industrial workers, capitalists oriented toward the national market, and white collar groups. It relied on populist economic ideology, nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, the threat of armed intervention in politics, and economic subsidies for state-owned and nationally-oriented economic sectors. Peronism used these tools to forestall liberal, democratic, free-trading, or revolutionary coalitions based on internationally-oriented economic sectors and unorganized workers (James 1976; Schoultz 1983).

The Peronist formula of rule was unstable for a host of reasons. Inherent contradictions in its coalition of labor and capitalist interests were barely papered over by populist and nationalist ideology. Electoral politics, always supplemented in the Perón era by the threat of illegal coercion or the outright resort to military coups, never became institutionalized as "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5 and chap. 12). The dirty war was an extreme manifestation of politics as usual in this incompletely democratizing regime.

A rather different mix of class, urban/rural, and ethnic politics is illustrated by the indigenous Maoist Shining Path's guerrilla campaign that began immediately following Peru's incomplete democratic transition in 1980. The incipient opening at the end of the 1970s had created a political space for popular groups such as Shining Path to organize, but the turn to electoral democracy in mainstream Peruvian political life, including most of Peru's left-wing parties, threatened to marginalize Shining Path. Seeing no electoral option and seeking to act before the

democratic regime could consolidate its power, the group turned to violence in a gamble to prevent its political irrelevance (Ron 2001).

Factional Electoral Struggle during Incomplete Democratization

Some civil wars followed an incomplete democratization that lacked sustained mass political mobilization or meaningful mass ideological politics. Sometimes these states held relatively free and fair elections, but lacked strong rule-of-law institutions (Lindberg 2006, 63). In these cases, shaky illiberal regimes, often facing international pressure to reform, gambled on shoring up their authority through elections. Typically, war resulted either from the loser's unwillingness to accept the outcome of the voting or from the winner's attempt to assert authoritarian control after the vote. In some of these cases, the risk of civil war may have been substantial whether elections were held or not. However, in other cases, including ones in which the international community pressed for elections that exacerbated factional strife, incomplete democratization catalyzed the onset of war.

Elections in such settings are risky, but they are not necessarily just an empty sham. Africanist Staffan Lindberg contends that even unfair elections conducted by illiberal regimes can be a meaningful step on the road to institutionalizing electoral politics. He sees political factions in weakly institutionalized states as playing a repeated prisoners' dilemma game, with strong incentives to establish rules to avoid endless rounds of fighting and chaos. In this view, even non-democrats can see the value of constitutions and elections in regularizing politics and helping them consolidate power (Lindberg 2006, 107-10). When such countries first begin to hold elections, he notes, they are at substantial risk of civil wars and coups (Lindberg 2006, 10-16, 86). If the system survives through three consecutive non-violent elections, however, he argues that politics becomes more regularized, if not truly liberal. Coups and civil wars become less likely. Expectations begin

to converge around the idea that elections determine who rules the country. Rulers and challengers start to accept the outcome of the voting.

Lindberg carries out statistical tests to show that the difference between the democratizing countries that fail after the first election and those that succeed in institutionalizing electoral politics cannot be explained by characteristics such as per capita income (Lindberg 2006, 129-41). Rather, he claims, holding even minimally successful elections leads to a self-reinforcing institutionalization of electoral politics. Lindberg, however, does not fully address the problems of selection bias and unobserved variables. He never satisfactorily explains the reason why some countries (like Botswana and Zambia) have succeeded in holding three consecutive successful elections, whereas others (like Angola, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) have not. It seems likely that something about the political situation or institutions that helped the country survive the first election without violence was still at work during the third. Despite having unresolved questions about his causal claims, we do think that his arguments warrant treating these kinds of cases as a form of incomplete democratization, not simply as sham electoral regimes.

While some illiberal regimes succeeded in their gamble that elections would strengthen their authority, several weakly institutionalized regimes in our dataset lost that gamble, often despite international support. For example, several authoritarian African regimes and factions caved in to international pressure to hold on elections in the early 1990s. They faced severe economic constraints as a result of widespread corruption and a reduction in economic and military aid from the great powers once the Cold War ended (Stedman 2004, 146-47). As a result, they lacked effective tools of repression and patronage. A number of weakened regimes resorted to constitutional or electoral politics to buy time or to reposition their authority on a more consensual footing.

While this led to more stable, democratic systems in some places, such as Mozambique, elsewhere the pluralistic opening quickly degenerated into a free-for-all among armed factions, some based on ethnicity and others centered on warlords controlling economic assets. An example is the 1996 fighting in the Central African Republic. In 1993, a reasonably free and fair French-backed election replaced the discredited dictator with Ange-Félix Patassé, the exiled crony of an earlier dictator. Although Patassé initially styled himself a champion of the poor, and popular protests played some role in the initial steps toward democracy, he created no programmatic ideology or sustained mass political movement. His political pronouncements have been characterized as lacking “ideological clarity or even coherence” (O’Toole 1997, 121). Patassé survived an armed insurrection and coup attempts mounted by ethnic and factional rivals with the help of his ethnic support base, international peacekeepers, and Libyan troops that were provided as part of a minerals deal. Patassé was finally toppled by a coup in 2003 (Lindberg 2006, 68).

In Angola, military pressure from Jonas Savimbi’s rebel group forced the ruling MPLA to accept UN-monitored elections in 1992. Many observers expected his UNITA party, with its strong Ovimbundu ethnic base, to do well in the elections. When the MPLA prevailed in the first round by a slim majority, Savimbi decided to shun the second round and return to armed struggle (Stedman 2004, 155).

Other countries that experienced civil wars growing out of similar factional struggles during incomplete democratization around the same time were Chad, the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), and Liberia (Miles 1995; Hirsch 2001, chap. 2; Adbajo 2002; Afoaku 2003; Kieh 2003; Kieh 2003; Clark 2007; Kirschke forthcoming).¹⁶ All of these states held competitive elections in the period before war began. In Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), the longtime dictator Mobutu

¹⁶ For a partially overlapping list of incompletely democratizing African countries that experienced military strife or coup attempts during this period, see Clark (2007, esp. 148-53).

Sese Seko—facing a crisis of resources, factional opposition, and government capacity—launched a constitutional reform dialogue in 1993 that our database codes as an incomplete democratic transition, but he reneged before elections could be held. His factionalized regime was toppled in the internationalized civil war that resulted from the influx of militarized refugees from the Rwandan civil war.

A common risk in poorly institutionalized, illiberal, factionalized polities is that the loser will refuse to accept the outcome of the election and instead will continue the contest with arms. In 1980, for example, Ugandan President Milton Obote stole the election from Yoweri Museveni, his former ally in the struggle against the murderous dictator Idi Amin. Museveni correctly calculated that he could out-organize and out-fight the unpopular Obote, prompting him to launch a guerrilla struggle that eventually brought him to power. The opposite risk is that the winner will take the election, whether fair or stolen, as a mandate to establish a corrupt dictatorship, as Charles Taylor did in Liberia after his internationally sponsored election in 1997. These predations soon provoked resistance and a renewed civil war in 1999 (Adebajo 2002, 231).

The 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic illustrates some of the same causal dynamics of factionalized incomplete democratization in a different geographic setting. Years of absolute dictatorship had undermined the well organized interest groups and pluralistic institutions that have been typical in even highly authoritarian Latin American states. In the wake of the assassination of Rafael Trujillo in 1961, politics was reduced to a chaotic struggle among shifting factions of military officers, students, and workers—Samuel Huntington’s quintessential “praetorian society” (Lowenthal 1969, 1972, chap. 2). Elections, encouraged by the Kennedy Administration as a way of forestalling a Cuba-type revolution, were won by the progressive but ineffectual Juan Bosch, who was toppled by a military coup. Factional warfare continued under the universally

disliked post-coup regime. In 1965 rebels took up arms to try to reinstate Bosch, triggering a US military intervention.

Conclusions and Prescriptive Implications

Countries undergoing incomplete democratic transitions are more than twice as likely to experience civil war as those with stable or autocratizing regimes. In incomplete democratic transitions, crumbling autocratic institutions are not adequately replaced by fledgling democratic institutions. Declining or rising elites may seek to fill the resulting authority gap through mass ideological appeals to nationalism, sectarianism, or economic populism. This can increase the chance of warfare and undermine the prospect of democratic consolidation because of the divisive, illiberal character of these appeals. Ideological politics may change attitudes and preferences in ways that make war more likely than if democratization had not occurred. Moreover, in other cases war may occur without significant ideological politics as a result of unregulated factional strife in an increasingly pluralistic setting. In cases where the regime might have chosen a different course (for example, if there were no international pressure to hold competitive elections), the factional struggle leading to war might have been less intense in the absence of democratization.

However, we do not argue that democratization is always dangerous or that democracy promotion is necessarily reckless. Over the past twenty-five years, many states have democratized successfully and peacefully when they enjoyed facilitating conditions such as relatively high per capita income, a strong base of political and administrative institutions, ethnic and sectarian homogeneity, favorable neighborhoods, and non-oil economies. But when such conditions are lacking, democratic openings should be initiated with extreme care. When possible, democratization efforts in countries without these advantages should proceed in a gradual or

sequenced way, starting to reform administrative institutions before proceeding too far with open electoral competition (Carothers 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 2007).

Lindberg argues that simply holding elections is a productive step on the road to a more orderly, open form of politics, even when the initial elections are unfairly conducted. For countries with sufficient political capacity to survive a first election without breaking down into warfare, it may be true that holding an election can help establish a positive, self-reinforcing trend. However, for countries lacking that capacity, holding elections may institutionalize a highly divisive pattern of ethnic, sectarian, economic populist, or militarist politics that may not only risk war, but also hinder subsequent attempts to consolidate liberal democracy. Of fifteen African states that experienced an election-related civil war or coup between 1989 and July 2003, only two have subsequently achieved Lindberg's magic number of three non-violent elections and only two have achieved two non-violent elections. States that start off on the wrong foot find it hard to get back on track (Lindberg 2006, 15).

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Appendix: Cases of Incomplete Democratization and Civil War

COW

Spain (1821)
Iran (1908)
Mexico (1914)*
Bulgaria (1923)
Peru (1923)
Greece (1944)
Dominican Republic (1965)
Thailand (1970)
Chad (1980)
Iran (1981)
Nicaragua (1982)
Liberia (1989)
Angola (1992)
Algeria (1992)
Burundi (1993)
Zaire/Dem. Republic of Congo (1993)
Rwanda (1994)
Zaire/Dem. Republic of Congo (1996)
Uganda (1996)

Sambanis

Dominican Republic (1965)
Argentina (1975)
Cambodia (1975)*
Chad (1980)*
Peru (1980)
Uganda (1981)
Nicaragua (1981)
Liberia (1989)
Algeria (1992)
Angola (1992)*
Republic of the Congo (1993)
Angola (1994)*
Chad (1994)*
Rwanda (1994)
Uganda (1995)
Afghanistan (1996)*
Central African Republic (1996)
Zaire/Dem. Republic of the Congo (1996)
Rwanda (1998)
Indonesia (1999)*

* These cases are excluded in those analyses (columns 4-6 in Tables 1 and 2) where we omit observations in which a civil war is ongoing in a given country.

Table 1 (a): Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis Based on the COW Data, 1816-1997

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dv	Min	Max
Civil War	10041	0.018	0.133	0	1
Complete Democratization	10041	0.029	0.168	0	1
No Transition	10041	0.862	0.345	0	1
Incomplete Democratization	10041	0.049	0.215	0	1
Autocratization	10041	0.060	0.237	0	1
Stable Autocracy	10041	0.285	0.452	0	1
Stable Anocracy	10041	0.361	0.480	0	1
Stable Democracy	10041	0.216	0.411	0	1
Population (logged)	10041	15.816	1.489	12.106	20.932
Development (logged per capita Energy Consumption)	10041	-1.359	2.162	-4.605	4.384
Neighbor War	10041	0.244	0.430	0	1

Table 1 (b): Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis Based on the Sambanis Data, 1945-1999

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dv	Min	Max
Civil War	5810	0.019	0.138	0	1
Complete Democratization	5810	0.043	0.203	0	1
No Transition	5810	0.818	0.386	0	1
Incomplete Democratization	5810	0.066	0.248	0	1
Autocratization	5810	0.073	0.261	0	1
Stable Autocracy	5810	0.337	0.473	0	1
Stable Anocracy	5810	0.212	0.409	0	1
Stable Democracy	5810	0.269	0.443	0	1
Population (logged)	5810	8.126	1.110	2.823	11.180
Development (logged real per capita GDP)	5810	15.976	1.480	12.108	20.938
Neighbor War	5810	0.466	0.499	0	1

Table 2: Models of Civil War Onset, Based on the COW Data, 1816-1997

Variables	All cases included			Ongoing years removed		
	Base Model	Stable Regimes	Fixed Effects	Base Model	Stable Regimes	Fixed Effects
Complete Democratization	-0.043 (0.521)	-0.078 (0.517)	-0.116 (0.489)	0.105 (0.534)	0.068 (0.531)	-0.051 (0.502)
No Transition	-0.702** (0.280)		-0.726** (0.281)	-0.762** (0.302)		-0.883** (0.298)
Autocratization	-0.976* (0.442)	-0.962* (0.440)	-1.147** (0.430)	-0.973* (0.453)	-0.960* (0.451)	-1.359** (0.452)
Stable Autocracy		-0.821* (0.373)			-0.888* (0.385)	
Stable Anocracy		-0.469* (0.277)			-0.551* (0.301)	
Stable Democracy		-1.339** (0.435)			-1.289** (0.454)	
Population	0.318*** (0.049)	0.327*** (0.048)	0.167 (0.224)	0.298*** (0.054)	0.303*** (0.054)	0.141 (0.237)
Development (per capita Energy Consumption)	-0.273*** (0.057)	-0.238*** (0.065)	-0.225* (0.089)	-0.263*** (0.061)	-0.232*** (0.070)	-0.259** (0.095)
Neighbor War	0.343* (0.162)	0.364* (0.165)	0.428* (0.182)	0.398* (0.182)	0.413* (0.187)	0.445* (0.195)
Time Since Last War	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.278 (0.226)	-0.274 (0.226)	-0.604* (0.246)			
Constant	-8.577*** (0.951)	-8.670*** (0.935)		-8.189*** (1.041)	-8.238*** (1.057)	
Log Likelihood	-827.364	-822.974	-644.440	-764.081	-760.884	-577.762
Pseudo R Squared	.083	.088	.022	.086	.090	.023
Chi Squared	93.231	168.347	28.391	86.771	141.207	27.364
N	10041	10041	5792	9496	9496	5269



Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Tests of statistical significance for the estimated coefficients of Complete Democratization, No Transition, Autocratization, Stable Autocracy, Stable Anocracy, and Stable Democracy are one tailed because their signs are specified by our argument. Tests of statistical significance for the remaining coefficient estimates are two tailed.

Table 3: Models of Civil War Onset, Based on the Sambanis Data, 1945-1999

Variables	All cases included			Ongoing years removed		
	Base Model	Stable Regimes	Fixed Effects	Base Model	Stable Regimes	Fixed Effects
Complete Democratization	-1.217* (0.639)	-1.242* (0.643)	-0.855 (0.667)	-0.841 (0.706)	-0.872 (0.707)	-0.038 (0.732)
No Transition	-0.832*** (0.265)		-0.732** (0.300)	-0.769* (0.344)		-0.659* (0.388)
Autocratization	-1.456*** (0.413)	-1.447*** (0.413)	-1.519** (0.505)	-1.153** (0.448)	-1.124** (0.446)	-1.358** (0.579)
Stable Autocracy		-0.932*** (0.300)			-0.884** (0.347)	
Stable Anocracy		-0.581* (0.297)			-0.434 (0.403)	
Stable Democracy		-1.114*** (0.358)			-1.134** (0.446)	
Development (per capita GDP)	-0.486*** (0.089)	-0.455*** (0.097)	-0.565* (0.259)	-0.461*** (0.101)	-0.422*** (0.108)	-0.783* (0.317)
Population	0.164* (0.065)	0.180** (0.069)	0.128 (0.433)	0.122 (0.064)	0.132* (0.065)	-0.241 (0.516)
Neighbor War	0.531* (0.214)	0.527* (0.219)	0.574* (0.292)	0.559* (0.220)	0.559* (0.220)	0.797* (0.344)
Time Since Last War	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.054*** (0.016)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.107*** (0.019)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.180 (0.303)	-0.194 (0.306)	-0.616+ (0.355)			
Constant	-2.019 (1.254)	-2.513 (1.397)		-1.682 (1.350)	-2.184 (1.416)	
Log Likelihood	-518.578	-517.039	-342.357	-430.182	-428.043	-247.453
Pseudo R Squared	.069	.072	.065	.059	.064	.103
Chi Squared	95.561	96.008	47.813	63.073	66.244	57.108
N	5810	5810	2602	5140	5140	1983

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Tests of statistical significance for the estimated coefficients of Complete Democratization, No Transition, Autocratization, Stable Autocracy, Stable Anocracy, and Stable Democracy are one tailed because their signs are specified by our argument. Tests of statistical significance for the remaining coefficient estimates are two tailed.

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Civil War for Democratizing, Autocratizing, and Stable Regimes, Based on the Sambanis Data and the COW Data



Note: To compute these predicted probabilities, we use the results in the first columns of Table 2 and Table 3. We set each continuous control variable to its mean value and we assume that no civil war was ongoing in year $t-1$.